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THE CONSTITUTION AS LAW
Larry Alexander*
At a recent meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in Miami, I chaired a symposium on "the Constitution as
hard law."1 The responses of the panelists to the topic were all over
• Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Leo Katz, Rich Pildisa, and Fred Schauer.
I. I introduced the topic of the section on Constitutional Law as follows:
Many argue that the Constitution has served us well for 200 years because, in
addition to its content, which many other countries have copied and even improved
upon, it is treated as "hard law," that is, as law in the ordinary sense. Put differently, the Constitution is treated as ordinary law in that its text is treated like any
other legal text and interpreted through a methodology that, like the methodology
used to interpret a stop sign, often makes possible agreement on its meaning among
adherents of different politicaVmoral philosophies.
The problem with the Constitution interpreted through such a methodology is
that the Constitution turns out to be imperfect from the point of view of practically
anyone's political and moral ideals. It permits--and may even require--considerable injustice and imprudence. But if that is so, then one wonders how the Constitution can be regarded as authoritative.
Seeking to preserve the Constitution's authority, many have repudiated methodologies of constitutional interpretation associated with ordinary legal texts-with
"hard law." They have argued instead that we "interpret" the Constitution by
looking to the most general, abstract purposes behind it, or by treating it as a collection of "contested concepts," or by rejecting reliance on the text or its framers entirely. The Constitution will become perfectible and authoritative because it will
become identical with correct political and moral ideals (those held by the proponent of this approach).
Moreover, many of those in the perfectionist camp reject as ultimately impossible the interpretive methodologies of hard law. Relying upon Continental deconstructionists or upon Wittgensteinian critiques of rule-following, they deny that the
hard law methodologies can ever succeed in constraining the politicaVmoral
choices of the present decisionmaker, even if the prior decision to be interpreted is
the decisionmaker's own decision and occurred in the immediate past. Interpreting
a prior decision is always a matter of political/moral choice. Hard law is a theoretical impossibility.
Those who regard the Constitution as hard law to be interpreted as is other
hard law respond that the perfectionists' methodology, by undermining the hard
law view of the Constitution, undermines the Constitution's efficacy. For the perfectionists, the Constitution amounts to no more than the redundant entreaty to do
what's just, good, and wise. But law that is "interpreted" so that it is always just,
good, and wise--perfect-in the eyes of the interpreter fails to fulfill the moral role
that makes law valuable. That role is to decide and settle, at least temporarily, what
is just, good, and right, even if the decision is viewed by some as incorrect. Law
cannot do this--cannot be "law"-if its "meaning" is always treated by it various
interpreters as what is really just, good, and right in their eyes. In other words, law
cannot fulfill the moral function signified by the notion of "a society of laws, not of
men," if its interpretive methodology leaves it unsettled to the extent that political
and moral debates remain unsettled. The proper methodology for interpreting law
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the map. Some believed that I had posed a false dilemma. For example, Cass Sunstein argued for some sort of Dworkinian middle
way between "the rules" and "the right." I have written elsewhere
about why I believe Dworkin's enterprise is wrongheaded, and what
I said applies equally to neo-Dworkinian approaches like Sunstein's.2 Mark Tushnet also assumed that I misstated the problem,
not because there is no such problem, but because it arises in private
law as well as in constitutional law. I was quite aware, however, as
my reference to the positivism/natural law debate makes clear, that
the same issue applies to all law, not just constitutional law.
Other panelists' responses were at the margins of the topic I
presented. Jack Balkin pointed out that, given stare decisis and the
practice of granting the judiciary final authority in interpreting the
Constitution, the practical meaning of the Constitution, if not its
original meaning, will change over time. Balkin correctly concludes, therefore, that a view of the Constitution as hard law entails
change, not stability, over time, at least if one assumes judicial finality and the practice of following precedent.
Richard Kay's paj,er dealt with the relative authority of the
Constitution's text vis-a-vis the intentions of its authors, concluding
that their intentions should be viewed as supremely authoritative.
In contrast to Kay, Michael Moore drew a distinction between theories of the Constitution's authority and theories of its interpretation. Bracketing the question of why the Constitution is
authoritative, Moore proceeded to defend his natural law theory of
interpretation. (Moore's theory of interpretation starts with word
meaning, which Moore links to the word's reference and not its
sense, and then qualifies word meaning by considerations of function, precedent, and a residual "not too evil" limitation.) I will
come back to Moore and Kay in the final part of this paper. For the
is one that preserves its status as law by creating the possibility that the law to be
interpreted will be less than perfect in some, and perhaps in all, eyes. Therefore, if
the Constitution has served and will serve us well because it is law, its nature as law
must not be undermined by perfectionist methods. An imperfect Constitution is
more "perfect" than a perfect Constitution.
This debate between the proponents of a hard law view of the Constitution and
the proponents of perfectionist methodologies of interpretation essentially replays
the fundamental jurisprudential debate between positivism and natural law over the
nature of law and its relation to what is just, this time with the U.S. Constitution
and its interpretation as its centerpiece. The natural lawyers claim that only just
law is authoritative. The positivists claim that only by separating law and morals
(and "interpreting" law so that such a separation is possible) can law fulfill its moral
role of settling moral issues; a natural law view of law paradoxically undermines the
moral value of law. The natural lawyers reply that the positivist enterprise is
doomed by the presence of political/moral choice in all interpretive acts. And so
on.
2. Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's
Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 419 (1987).
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moment I will make only two comments about their responses.
First, they both bracket the question of the Constitution's authority
and thus avoid wrestling with the dilemma I posed. Second, theories of authority and theories of interpretation cannot be separated.
The remaining panelists all took on the central dilemma that I
posed. Erwin Chemerinsky acknowledged the tension between constraint and flexibility, pronounced it insoluble in theory, and then
came down on the side of flexibility with at least two cheers (and I
suspect three). Fred Schauer, on the other hand, although ostensibly only posing the question of whether we should view the Constitution as a rule, an entrenched generalization, that we should follow
even when it prescribes imperfect results, seemed clearly to favor
the answer that indeed we should prefer to be ruled by rules.J I
think that Fred gave at least one and a half cheers to the opposite
hom of the dilemma from that seized by Erwin. My colleague,
Maimon Schwarzschild, warmly embraced the whole dilemma. He,
like Erwin, saw it to be insoluble, and, like Erwin, he saw the virtue
of viewing the Constitution as flexible and inspirational rather than
as hard law. But, like Fred, he also saw the virtue of viewing the
Constitution as a set of constraining rules, as a keel as well as a sail.
For Maimon, constitutional law is ultimately a paradox, a muddle,
a matter of correct intuitive balance that cannot be made a matter
of precise formula. Maimon is a devotee of the British philosopher
Isaiah Berlin, who deems values to be plural and incommensurable,
and who consequently denies that all good things are part of the
same good thing.
My intuition is that Berlin and Schwarzschild are correct,
though the system builder in me recoils at the idea of irreconcilable
values and choices unguidable by formula. At present, I have found
no way to resolve the dilemma I posed. In what follows, however, I
want to present it more extensively than I have previously and to
show what the problem of the Constitution's authority4 is and how
it relates to the problem of interpretation.
I

What follows is going to be overly simplified, though I hope
not simple minded.
3. See also, Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988); Schauer, The Jurisprudence
of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1987); Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 41 (1987).
4. I have discussed the relation between the Constitution and practical authority in
several prior articles. See e.g., Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive
Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 447,458-62 (1983); Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4-16 (1981).
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The problem of authority arises because of controversy within
a society regarding what ought to be done. There may and likely
will be controversy at the level of ultimate political/moral principles. But even if there is society-wide agreement at that level-even
if, for example, everyone in a society accepted John Rawls's theory
of justice5 or Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism6.-there
would still be controversy over which more particular norms, actions, and decisions were required by that theory. The solution is to
grant authority to persons or institutions to decide what ought to be
done both in general and in particular cases. A society of more
than a handful of people will need not only authoritative decisions
resolving particular disputes, but also authoritative decisions about
broad categories of cases, that is, general rules. (Enough has been
said about the rule of law virtues of predictability/stability/constraint-of-decisionmakers so that I don't have to explain why they
are virtues in any large society and why, therefore, it is good to have
general rules.) Interestingly, much of what is trendy in current
legal scholarship views the abstract, general quality of legal rules as
something to be overcome rather than as something to be sought.
Legal rules are not as richly textured as life. But we wouldn't want
them to be.7
The function of authorities and authoritative decisions is to replace the ultimate political/moral principles that justify particular
actions by norms that are to preempt those principles in people's
deliberations about what to do. There is thus a strong connection
between authority and formalism, since it is the nature of formal
rules that they are opaque to the more general principles that lie
behind them.
At the apex of the hierarchy of authoritative norms are those
that we may deem "constitutional." These are the norms that define authoritative institutions, their powers and limits, how and by
whom their products shall be authoritatively interpreted, and perhaps how these constitutional norms may be changed. Some constitutional norms may be embodied in texts, as in the United States;
but in any society some constitutional norms will be non-textual,
and in some societies (such as Great Britain) all constitutional
norms will be non-textual. What Richard Kay calls "preconstitu5. ]. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
6. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA·
TION (1789).
7. They would fail to perform their function if they were too particularized. Indeed,
it's hard to believe that those who criticize legal rules for their abstract generality don't favor
precise speed limits, statutes of limitations, or precise times for beginning classes.
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tional rules"B-norms about how the written Constitution should
be interpreted, who shall have the final say about its interpretation,
and whether the principle of stare decisis applies to constitutional
interpretations-! would call constitutional norms that are merely
unwritten. These constitutional norms derive their authority
merely from their acceptance by members of society. For those
who do not accept them, they are not authoritative, though there
may be reasons for those who do not accept their authority to comply with them.
What is the ultimate test for whether one should accept as authoritative a certain set of constitutional norms? Although many
theories of political obligation have been put on the table-consent
theories of both express and tacit varieties, fairness theories, respect
for authority theories, and, in earlier times, divine right theories-!
believe that only one kind of argument succeeds in justifying the
authority of constitutional norms, and that is a consequentialist argument. Simply put, we justify a constitutional arrangement by
showing that adherence to that arrangement will work out for the
best, the best being defined by whatever politicaVmoral theory we
accept. Thus, if we are Rawlsians, we justify a constitutional arrangement by showing that in the long run, adherence to the arrangement will best promote realization of Rawls's principles (and
will not violate any Rawlsian side-constraints). In other words, a
choice of constitutional norms is in large part strategic. It is based
on a calculation of whether adherence to those norms will over time
bring us closer to the state of affairs that our political/moral beliefs
deem desirable than alternative constitutional arrangements.
Now the dilemma of law arises from the fact that at both the
constitutional and non-constitutional levels, the authoritative rules
and decisions may be incorrect in terms of the political/moral theory that we accept. There are two ways in which the authoritative
rules can be incorrect, though I will argue that they are really just
two versions of the same way.
The first way in which the authoritative rules may be incorrect
is straightforward: the rules are not the rules that we should have
chosen to govern us. There is another set of rules that is better in
terms of our ultimate political/moral theory.
The second way in which the authoritative rules may be incorrect lies in the very nature of formal rules, their opacity to the reasons that generated them. Once our ultimate political/moral
considerations have led us to promulgate a rule, the rule's function
8.

Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
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is to preempt further recourse to those considerations. We are to
abide by the rule, not the reasons behind it. Now the consequence
is that application of the rules will sometimes lead to results that
conflict with the results that correct application of the underlying
political/moral principles would yield. The very aspects of rules
that make them capable of noncontroversial application and thus a
solution to controversy over political/moral principles also make
even the best rules diverge from their underlying political/moral
bases in some applications. It is to be expected that even the best
rules will produce results at odds with those that the best political/
moral principles would produce when correctly applied.
We now have the outline of the dilemma posed by authoritative rules. Our political/moral principles, unmediated by authoritative rules, will generate controversy, unpredictability, instability,
unconstrained decisionmaking, and so forth. On their own terms,
these principles require that they be mediated by authoritative rules
that are to preempt these principles in decisionmakers' deliberations. But a decisionmaker will, in some instances, get a different
result under an authoritative rule from the result dictated by the
unmediated political/moral principles. Reasons require rules that
require results different from the results required by the reasons.
The dilemma facing decisionmakers under authoritative rules
can be softened somewhat by the recognition that departure from
the authoritative rules may undermine those rules and produce
worse consequences (in terms of the political/moral principles) than
adherence will produce. This fact narrows the gap between what
the rules require and what the reasons require, though, as I have
pointed out in another piece, it does not eliminate that gap.9 Ultimately one has to face the paradox that there are reasons to have
rules and to base decisions on them rather than on their underlying
reasons, and there are reasons-ultimately the same reasons-to depart from the rules in particular cases.1o
I want to return at this point to the first way in which authoritative rules may be incorrect, that is, when they are inferior to an
alternative set of rules. We might think that in such a case the
course of action we should adopt is clear: we should refuse to recognize the authority of the inferior rules and instead operate under
the superior alternative set. But things are not quite so simple. We
may conclude that a set of rules claiming to be authoritative is the
best set we can get others to agree to, even if it is not the best set we
9.
10.
59.

Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985).
/d. See also M. DETMOLD, THE UNITY OF LAW AND MORALITY (1984), esp. 252-
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can imagine. Or we may conclude that the costs in terms of our
political/moral principles of seeking agreement on a superior set of
rules outweigh the costs of sticking with an inferior set of rules. For
example, no one may believe that the Constitution is an ideal set of
authoritative rules in terms of his or her own political/moral principles. But everyone may believe that the Constitution is, in terms of
those same principles, the best set of authoritative rules that it is
possible to get everyone, or enough others, to accept as authoritative. Thus, in the real, imperfect world, the Constitution may be
ideal. What this shows is that the first way in which authoritative
rules may be incorrect is really just an instance of the second way.
What appears to be an incorrect set of authoritative rules may be
the correct set given the constraints of the real world, which include
the costs of getting people to agree to a particular set of authoritative rules.tt
As an aside here, my colleague, Chris Wonnell, has recently
published an article distinguishing what might be called ideal political theory and real-world political theory, a distinction that
roughly parallels my distinction between political/moral theories
directly applied and political/moral theories mediated by authoritative rules and institutions.12 The point I wish to make is that the
relation of the ways in which authoritative rules may be incorrect
shows that these are not just two levels of political/moral theory,
but an indefinite number of such levels, each defined by how many
real world constraints are assumed. Even what Chris deems ideal
political/moral theory usually assumes some real world constraints-for example, that human beings are corporeal, that they
face scarcity, and so forth. Working down from that level, the various levels of political/moral theory build in more and more facts
about the world, such as limitations on information, normal motivational structures, in-place institutional and cultural forms, and so
forth.
One final point before moving from the problems of authority
to the problems of interpretation. Suppose that at time one we decide that a certain set of constitutional rules will be authoritative for
us. Does that decision have any privileged status, or should we conII. Put slightly differently, the real world constraints that make acting directly under
one's political/moral principles inferior to acting on the basis of authoritative rules also make
agreeing to a moderately decent set of authoritative rules superior to holding out for an ideal
set of authoritative rules. Or, to put the point still differently, the proper meta-rule for choosing a set of rules to be authoritative is to choose that set among those that can gamer general
acceptance that is best under one's political/moral principles so long as it is superior to acting
without a set of authoritative rules.
12. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy to Law, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 123 (1987).
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sider ourselves free at any time to reconsider the authority of those
rules? Of course, any reconsideration will have to face the costs of
abandoning one set of rules as authoritative in favor of another,
costs that will in general create a presumption in favor of the rules
chosen at time one. But the costs of change may turn out to be low
enough relative to the benefits, in which case reconsideration of our
earlier decision will produce a different decision. Are there nonetheless reasons for not reconsidering?
The troubling answer, I believe, is that there are reasons
against reconsidering.J3 The benefits produced by authoritative
rules dissipate substantially if the rules are too easily changed. A
rule that is not entrenched temporally is not a rule at all.14 If we
can reconsider authoritative rules at any and thus at all times, then
we lose the stability and predictability the rules are designed to
bring. The same point holds for constitutional rules. Yet, on the
other hand, is it not irrational not to reconsider rules when the benefits of reconsideration outweigh the costs, including the costs to
stability engendered by the reconsideration itself?Js
What this means for the authority of constitutional rules is
that, on the one hand, their authority is always assessed from the
perspective of the present, yet on the other hand, their authority
may spring from an earlier decision that we at present are rationally
disposed not to reconsider. Constitutional authority is a rational
irrationality, a paradox, a muddle.
II

In this section I'm going to relate what I've said about constitutional authority to the debate over interpretation. I'm much more
13. See Bratman, "Personal Policies," Working Paper RR-8, Center for Philosophy and
Public Policy (1987); DETMOLD, supra note 10 at 127-28.
14. On temporal entrenchment, see Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 A.B.F. RES. J. 379.
15. It seems irrational both never to reconsider decisions about authoritative rules and
always to reconsider them. In our personal life as well, it seems irrational both never to
reconsider our plans and always to reconsider them. The problem is that it also seems impossible to know when to reconsider without engaging in the reconsideration. We want to have
the proper disposition with respect to reconsidering our decisions, but whether we have it
depends upon knowledge that the disposition may properly prevent us from obtaining. Information is one commodity, the costs of obtaining which cannot be appraised in its absence.
See Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 LAW &
PHILOSOPHY I, 18-19 (1987).
Even perfectionists must have a rule determining when to cease acquiring additional
information regarding what course of action to take. That rule may in any given case dictate
the wrong decision. But the perfectionist cannot know whether the rule is correctly terminating further inquiry without engaging in the very inquiry the rule is supposed to terminate.
This point was suggested to me by Leo Katz.
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uncertain of the terrain here, and my conclusions are quite tentative, to put it mildly. I will state these conclusions, if they can be
called such, in a brief, sketchy fashion.
First, although Michael Moore suggested in his paper that the
theory of a text's authority and the theory of its interpretation are
separate matters, I can't see how they can be. In deeming a text to
be authoritative for us, we must have in mind, if not what the text
means, at least how its meaning will be ascertained. Indeed, to
deem something a text and not just a parchment with ink marks
already is to adopt an interpretive methodology. Looked at another
way, we choose an interpretive methodology to be authoritative at
the same time we choose a text to be authoritative, and both the text
and its interpretive methodology are part of the complete set of authoritative norms that we must choose.
Second, our choice of interpretive methodologies ultimately
must be based on the same kind of consequentialist reasoning on
which our other decisions concerning authority are based: what
will best promote our political/moral ideals in the long run. To
give one example, if we believe that the framers of the Constitution
were divinely inspired, we would give far more weight to the specific
meaning they attached to words and to how they would have clarified the ambiguities, contradictions, vague terms, and gaps in the
Constitution's text than we might otherwise.
Third, our decisions regarding what shall be our authoritative
and constitutional norms-since they are not themselves embodied
in a text, but are meta-textual-must be "interpreted" according to
our "original intentions"; indeed, they are nothing but our original
intentions.
Fourth, despite the Wittgensteinian and deconstructionist critiques, words can and do constrain.'6 Texts can be more determinant
than political/moral theories, and they can therefore perform the
function of furthering the ends of political/moral theories by eliminating destructive controversy over what those theories require.
Both Marxists and anarchists-and everyone in between--can understand the meaning of a stop sign without resort to their moral
theories.
Fifth, consistent with the points made in the previous section,
it would not be morally ideal for us to interpret texts in terms of
their ultimate purpose of furthering correct political/moral principles. In other words, we should not ignore the text in favor of the
16. See Schauer, Formalism 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96
YALE L.J. 613 (1987); Solum, On the lnterdeterminancy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
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ultimate purposes behind it, even if we judge the text to be mistaken
in terms of those purposes. To do so defeats the very purpose of
having authoritative texts and thus in some sense defeats the purposes behind the text in the name of furthering them.
Sixth, the real debate over interpretation then is where proper
interpretation is located in relation to the following two polar positions: at one pole, the text is to be read with only minimal contextual assumptions, such as that the words are in a particular
language, that they mean what a standard contemporaneous dictionary would say they mean, and so forth; at the other pole, the
text is to be read as Richard Posner has recently advocated, that is,
as evidence of a superior authority's plan,17 like orders from a commanding general to a field officer. At this polar position, we would
ideally replace the text with an ongoing conference call to the text's
authors if we only could do so. Their intentions, not the text, are
what really matters on this position.
Actually, the Posnerian position is too extreme to be within the
field of play of a tenable theory of interpretation for constitutional
texts. First, government-by-conference-call does not produce the
stability and predictability that authoritative norms should produce.
Second, if we as law appliers are in constant communication with
the lawmakers, we can point out to them how their "original" orders rest on mistaken factual, logical, or normative assumptions and
thus should be revised to further their ultimate purpose, which is to
do what is right, just, good, and wise. Is Not only does this make for
instability, it also allows the subordinate law applier to justify doing
whatever she thinks is right, just, good, and wise in the name of
carrying out the superior's orders.
Therefore, the extreme Posnerian model must be rejected. The
range of choices is now narrowed. The intent of the framers must
be honored on any theory, at least to the extent that their intent to
create a text, their intent to write the text in English, and their intent to rely on other minimal contextual assumptions are assumed.
On the other hand, when the terms they employed are ambiguous,
vague, internally contradictory, destructive of their obvious lowlevel purposes, or evil or absurd, there can be legitimate disagreement over whether we should interpret the text as seems best, or
whether we should interpret the text as the framers would have
wanted us. If we take the latter tack, we must then decide what
17. Posner, Legal Formalism. Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE WEST. L. REv. 179 (1986).
18. See Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review,
supra note 4 at 451-54.
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assumptions about the framers' informational bases we should make
in attributing the requisite counter-factual desires to them.
Similarly, there is legitimate disagreement over how far we
should carry the implications of what is in the text beyond what the
text constrains us to do. Should we read the text to cover new practices that are closely analogous to practices clearly covered? Should
we draw out the implications even further?t9 On the one hand, we
need to avoid making texts immediately obsolete because of crabbed
readings. On the other hand, too much implication destroys the
distinction between textual and nontextual decisionmaking and
hence the stabilizing function of texts. It also leads to the problem
that Dworkin faces of creating an imperative to do evil so as to
cohere with existing evil texts. There is a justification for clear
rules, even if they are incorrect. There is no justification for constructing from such rules, and then extending, principles that are
both incorrect and controversiat.2o
Finally, the interpretive debates over whether terms should be
interpreted according to their psychological sense or according to
their real world reference2t must also be resolved by asking which
approach best furthers the consequentialist function of drafting authoritative norms. Michael Moore has made a strong case on consequentialist grounds against the kind of intentionalist approaches
advocated by Kay and Posner and in favor of finding the meaning
of legal texts in the best theories of those things to which the texts
refer. I'm not sure where I come out on this debate.22 I do agree
with Moore that ultimately a theory of constitutional interpretation
is justified by its consequences in terms of our political/moral ideals. And that is how it links up with the theory of the Constitution's authority.

19. Two closely related questions-perhaps even the same question put differently-are
what is the default position when the constitutional text does not explicitly cover an issue,
and how is that default position related to the background assumptions of the framers?
20. See Alexander, supra note 2 at 427-31.
21. See Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICS 834, 858-59 (1987).
22. See Alexander, supra note 2 at 426 n.l4.

